We examine training and recruitment policies in a two-period model that nests two forms of production, "routine" work where ability and e¤ort are substitutes and "creative" work where they are complements. Alternative ways of improving average ability have opposite implications for agents' career concerns. While teaching to the top (training complementary to ability) or identifying star performers increases agents' career concerns, teaching to the bottom has the opposite e¤ect. The paper also makes more general comments relating to models of reputation.
In the next decade and beyond, the ability to attract, develop, retain and deploy sta¤ will be the single biggest determinant of a professional service …rm's success. Maister [1997] p. 189 
Introduction
Popular press and academic literature have come to stress the importance of recruitment and development of sta¤ in industries where human capital plays a critical role. 1 This popular literature tends to recommend recruiting the "best" and training them. There are, of course, costs as well as bene…ts to recruitment and training. In this paper, we highlight that there may be indirect costs and bene…ts through the e¤ect on employees' incentives. Thus, the central contribution of this paper is to highlight that in addition to a¤ecting the quality of sta¤, training and recruitment policies also play a role in a¤ecting the behaviour of employees through their career concern incentives. In human capital intensive industries including professional services such as the law, audit, consulting, and architecture, career concern incentives are of paramount importance.
As discussed in Fama [1980] and Holmström [1982/99] , agents may exert e¤ort in trying to persuade future employers that they are of high ability, that is, they may be motivated by career concerns. 2 It is clear that their motivation will depend on the beliefs of potential future employers; and a principal contribution of this paper is to note that recruitment 1 This literature includes Michaels et al. [2001] , Maister [1997] , Smart [1999] , Hacker [2001] and no doubt many others. 2 A wide literature has extended and considered applications of the career concerns framework. Most relevant to this paper, Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole [1999] provide a thorough analysis characterizing the impact of di¤erent information structures (mappings from ability and e¤ort into observable outcomes). Others have focused on speci…c applications, whose primary e¤ect is to alter such information structures, in particular through teamwork (Meyer [1994] and Jeon [1996] ) and delegation of power (Ortega [2003] , Blanesi-Vidal [2007] ). More recently Harstad [2007] , Casas-Arce [2005] and Martinez [2005] consider di¤erent micro-foundations for career concerns models with non-linear returns functions and their implications.
and training policies will change these.
In particular, we highlight that while many di¤erent training and recruitment policies might have the same e¤ect on the average level of ability of employees, they can have very di¤erent (and indeed exactly opposite) implications for incentives.
Our model allows us to present and discuss two di¤erent kinds of training or productivity enhancement. One that a¤ects an employee's "core knowledge" that is valuable for tasks which do not require e¤ort, and another that raises productivity for work that does require e¤ort. We show that whichever policy is most e¤ective in raising the overall productivity of those workers who are already most productive will lead to higher incentives for employees. Similarly, recruitment policies that are more focused on …nding the very best workers lead to higher incentives for employees and recruitment policies that ensure that the least able are seldom recruited reduce employees'incentives.
There are two channels through which training can have an e¤ect. First, training that is geared towards the most able increases the dispersion of the possible types of an employee so that observations are more informative. Second, training the top implies there is a greater pecuniary payo¤ to revealing yourself to be there. Recruitment policies that focus on identifying superstars rather than identifying inept performers have similar e¤ects through both channels.
We can distinguish between di¤erent training policies and highlight that the key is the e¤ect on the most productive since our model nests two models of production. One in which ability substitutes for e¤ort (one might think in this case of ability as signifying knowledge of a routine task) and another in which ability and e¤ort are complements (one might think of more able agents in this case as more likely to have the inspiration which allows hard work to reap rewards).
The career concerns literature and most of the reputation literature has viewed e¤ort and ability as substitutes. However, more recent literature on reputational concerns in e¤ect takes the opposite view and suggests that this view of reputation might lead to somewhat di¤erent e¤ects. 3 In particular Mailath and Samuelson [2001] show that when reputation is a concern to avoid appearing inept then in a …nite-horizon model reputation e¤ects cannot arise. Further, Moav and Neeman [2005] suggest that more precise information can reduce incentives. We discuss at some length how our di¤erent views of the production process relate to this recent literature on reputation. Further, we make the methodological point that when e¤ort and ability are not perfect complements, reputation e¤ects do arise and are similar to the substitutes case.
Model
We introduce a two period model with a continuum of types of agents parameterized by t 2 [0; 1]. Speci…cally in Period 1 a type t agent will have no strategic decision to make with probability t and in this case will succeed (for example by producing a high quality product) with probability and fail with probability 1
. Otherwise (with probability 1 t) the agent must make an e¤ort decision. Note that she only gets to make a strategic decision when her e¤ort has an e¤ect; or, equivalently, she knows which kind of task she is performing before she takes her e¤ort decision. 4 In this latter case, when she chooses e¤ort e, she succeeds with probability + e. Thus overall a t-type agent exerting e¤ort e when given the opportunity to exert e¤ort would succeed with probability t + (1 t)( + e) and fail otherwise. E¤ort is costly and, speci…cally, exerting e¤ort e costs the agent 4 Similar results can be obtained when the agent does not know her own type and does not know which kind of task she faces. If she knows her own type but does not know the kind of task that she faces then di¤erent types would make di¤erent e¤ort decisions.
Let g(t) denote the distribution function for the types of agent and let T denote the average type (according to the ex-ante beliefs) T = R 1 0 tg(t)dt and let V = R 1 0 (t T ) 2 g(t)dt denote the variance of this prior distribution. This distribution function of types is common knowledge among the agent and employers.
Employers are risk neutral, value a success at 1 and a failure at 0 and they Bertrand compete for the agent's service in each period. 5 Moreover, outcomes are observable but e¤ort is not observable and contracts are incomplete, so that in e¤ect an agent is paid in advance at a wage which is simply the employers' common belief that the agent will produce a success.
There are two periods of trade, and outcomes are observed (and beliefs revised) in between the two periods. 6 Speci…cally, timing is as follows: Notice that in period 2, we could allow the agents the opportunity to exert e¤ort but no agent would do so. Note that whether the agent knows her type or not would have no e¤ect on this model since she has no ability to signal her type (we rule out long-term and outcome contingent contracts) and at the point where an agent has to make an e¤ort decision then the problem is identical for all types.
We suppose that the agent weighs the two periods equally and maximizes the sum of pro…ts for the two periods. We solve for the e¤ort exerted in the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Interpreting the model
It is worth highlighting that type t captures the agent's likelihood of getting an opportunity to engage in strategic behaviour. One cannot interpret a high t as low or high ability until all the parameters of the model are speci…ed
The model is intended to re ‡ect that agents might be confronted with a variety of di¤erent tasks, and the nature of the particular task undertaken is unobserved by employers.
For example, employers hiring consultants …nd it di¢ cult to determine the extent to which the project that they are assigning is a complex one or a simple one. Similarly, the di¢ culty of the project depends on the consultant's ability and experience. Depending on the value of , the model allows for somewhat di¤erent interpretations of the productive process and of the interpretation of high values of t as re ‡ecting high or low ability.
Speci…cally, when is su¢ ciently high, high t re ‡ects high ability; an agent with a high value of t …nds it costless to succeed in a wide range of tasks, in this case ability and e¤ort are substitutes and an agent would like employers to believe that she has a high value of t.
One could think of this case as representing "routine"work, where more able workers know how to do more things and if they know how to perform the task that they are assigned they will succeed with high probability. 7 If they do not have the requisite knowledge they could exert e¤ort to acquire it, by reading the appropriate manuals for example. Examples include translation work, mechanics, and routine work in low levels of management in an organizational hierarchy.
In contrast, when is su¢ ciently low, then one can think of agents for whom (1 t) is higher as being more able, and e¤ort and ability as complements. In this case even if the agent has some understanding of the task, exerting e¤ort will still improve the outcome, however if she has no understanding of the task then she will surely fail. Here, one needs some ability in order to have any chance of success (one needs ability to have the ‡ash of inspiration) but this in itself will not guarantee success, hard work is also required. This may be more appropriate for creative work, such as writing a Ph.D., writing advertisements or high level management which is not routine.
Note, that in the case that = 0, the agent would prefer employers to believe that she is a type with a low value of t and so when = 0, one should think of agents with low values of t as more able.
In application, of course many jobs will include elements of both creative and routine work, however for di¤erent jobs or at di¤erent times in an individual's career (or within an organizational hierarchy) it will be more appropriate to think of work as primarily of one or other of these two production types.
In both these cases we can think of more able agents as having facility in some tasks but not in others. The di¤erence in productivity for a task in which one has facility and in which one does not when exerting no e¤ort (which is the case in period 2) is simply given by j j.
Equilibrium analysis
Trivially, when faced with an e¤ort decision, all agents make the same choice of e¤ort.
This follows since the bene…ts, as determined by equilibrium beliefs following success and failure, are identical for all agents and the costs are identical for all agents, even though the frequency with which they have to make such decisions alters.
Suppose that employers anticipate that agents exert e¤ort x when they have an opportunity to exert e¤ort in the …rst period. Then using Bayes' rule and rearranging terms, and as proven in Appendix A, the wages that employers would pay following a success and failure respectively are given by:
An agent's problem, where relevant, is to choose e to maximize
The …rst order condition yields that e = S(x) F (x) and a rational expectations equilibrium is de…ned by the e¤ort level x that satis…es:
Given this characterization, the following results ensue (and are proven in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 Equilibrium e¤ ort is well-de…ned and unique. Further (i) The equilibrium
e¤ ort e is lower than the e¢ cient solution
Note in particular that since equilibrium e¤ort is unique, comparative statics exercises are well de…ned and can be explored. Note, further, as discussed at some length in Section 2.1, that in the case where is high ( > ) or is low ( < ) the model has natural interpretations as capturing "routine"and "creative"production respectively. Finally, note that when conducting these comparative statics results, we assume that parameters remain common knowledge among all agents, employers and potential employers; in particular, in the context of Sections 5.1 and 5.2, when we consider a …rm choosing a recruitment or training strategy, it is assumed that these choices are known and understood by all market participants.
Comparative Static Results
The …rst result is a very intuitive one, if e¤ort is less costly then the agent will exert more e¤ort (when relevant) in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium e¤ ort e is increasing in
Proof. It is convenient to de…ne h(
Note that by the arguments of the proof of Proposition 1, h(x) is decreasing in the range (0; ). Using the Implicit Function Theorem and so it is su¢ cient to consider that expression for a = , that is to consider
and so taking the derivative with respect to , we obtain
Therefore, we conclude that the optimal e¤ort e is increasing in :
Next we turn to comparative statics with respect to V . The intuition here is clear, the greater the variance in the distribution of types, the more scope that the observation of a success or failure has to shift beliefs and the associated rewards. This is a familiar intuition (from Holmström [1982/99] for example). Here we highlight that the result depends on V and no other characteristics of the distribution (in particular, we do not restrict that g(:)
be Normal).
Proposition 3
The optimal e¤ ort e is increasing in V .
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 2, the sign of de dV is simply the sign of
Taking the derivative with respect to V yields:
Notice that while increasing V or has a clear monotonic e¤ect on e¤ort, the comparative statics with respect to other parameters depend on which of the two interpretations alluded to in the description of the model in Section 2 applies, that is, whether an agent's reputational concern is to try to convince employers that she is a "high t" type or a "low t" type.
First, we consider comparative statics with respect to . Underlying the following result are two e¤ects, …rst that it is more important to show oneself to be at the top of the ability distribution (or having facility in a greater range of tasks that is high t in the case when is high, low t in the case when is low) the greater the di¤erence between the productivity of an agent in a task in which she has facility and her productivity in one which she does not, regardless of her level of e¤ort (that is the greater is j xj for all e¤ort levels x).
Secondly as j xj increases then an observation of success or failure becomes more informative. We distinguish explicitly between these two e¤ects in the discussion in Section 5.3. In particular therefore when is high, one would expect that an increase in should reduce e¤ort, but when is low, it would increase equilibrium e¤ort. Note however that in all cases, increasing raises the average productivity of the agent. Similar considerations apply with regard to comparative statics in . The proposition below demonstrates that these intuitions are borne out.
Proposition 4 Equilibrium e¤ ort is increasing in but decreasing in when < but decreasing in and increasing in when > .
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 2, it is su¢ cient to consider @h @ , and
Notice that the denominators are always positive. Since, by Proposition 1(ii) when > then also > + x, it follows that in this case
Again the denominators are always positive and if > , then
and ( ) are positive, similarly if < , then
Discussion

Targeted training or productivity enhancement
Our model allows for di¤erent kinds of training, or productivity enhancing technology. In the model, increasing and increasing can both increase the ability of agents, and can readily be interpreted as the result of training directed towards di¤erent types of agents or di¤erent kinds of productivity-enhancing technologies. A …rm may wonder whether there is much di¤erence, for example, in giving employees access to a database that expands their core knowledge (increasing ) or giving them access to software that allows for more e¤ective work (increasing ).
As demonstrated in Proposition 4, these two means of increasing average ability have exactly opposite e¤ects for equilibrium e¤ort. In particular for low values of when an agent would like employers to believe that she is a "low t"type then raising the ability of a "low t"type relatively more than raising the ability of a "high t"type (either by decreasing or by increasing ) heightens this reputational concern. As discussed below, it does so through two channels, by raising the pecuniary value of showing oneself to be a higher type and by making the outcome more informative about the agent's type.
Similarly in the case where is high, then agents with high t are the most productive and a greater distinction between the most able and the least able (here by increasing or decreasing ) will heighten the reputational concern for agents seeking to convince consumers that they are the most able.
Thus in all cases raising the productivity of the most able agents (or reducing the productivity of the least able) increases the equilibrium e¤ort.
Recruitment policies and searching for superstars
While training as described above a¤ects the productivity of a given type and thereby a¤ects the prior beliefs about an agent's productivity, interviewing and recruitment policies directly a¤ect the initial belief about the distribution of types g(t). When employers seek recruitment policies which select better agents, there are various ways in which this can be achieved. Consider the case when is high (so that types with high values of t are the better agents); a recruitment policy that selects better agents will lead to a shift in the prior distribution from g(t) with associated T and V , to a di¤erent prior distribution g 0 (t)
with associated T 0 > T and V 0 . Following Proposition 2, among all policies with the same e¤ect on average ability (that generate the same T 0 ), an employer would prefer to choose a policy that raised rather than reduced the variance of the distribution. When superstars and disastrous potential recruits are rare, then it follows that employers concerned with employees' e¤orts would be better using recruitment policies that concentrated more on ensuring that any potential superstars were recruited than ruling out the worst of the applicants. 8 8 For example, suppose that with no recruitment policy, types are distributed according to the degenerate distribution g(0) = . Now consider, two recruitment policies which raise the average ability, one does so by reducing the probability of recruiting disasters. Speci…cally Policy A leads to the distribution gA(0) = 1 20 , gA( . Policy B increases the probability of identifying superstars and leads to the distribution gB(0) = 1 10 , gB( . Since VB > VA it follows by Proposition 2 that, while both policies raise average ability equally, the latter policy would lead to greater equilibrium e¤ort compared to the …rst and so would be preferred.
The information and value e¤ects
By adapting the model slightly to suppose that in period 2 a type t agent succeeds with probability t 0 + (1 t) 0 , we can distinguish between two channels through which changes in ability as discussed in Proposition 4 and Section 5.1 a¤ect incentives. Speci…cally, in
and similar qualitative results apply.
Proposition 5 Equilibrium e¤ ort is increasing in and 0 but decreasing in and 0 when ; 0 < but decreasing in and 0 and increasing in and 0 when ; 0 > .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4, it is su¢ cient to consider
,and
which is negative when < but positive when > . Similarly,
which is positive when < but negative when > .
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 4, the derivatives have the signs claimed in the relevant parameter ranges.
Thus Proposition 5 demonstrates that the overall e¤ect of changing the abilities of types through changes to and described in Proposition 4 can be decomposed into two distinct mechanisms.
First consider the comparative statics with respect to the second period productivities 0 , and 0 . Fixing some e¤ort level, then the beliefs about the type of an agent following either a success or a failure do not change as 0 or 0 changes. However, since the belief that the agent is excellent following a success is higher than it is following a failure, raising (lowering) 0 in the case where 0 > (where 0 < ) increases S-the agent's wage following a success-by more than it increases F , the wage following failure. Since incentives are stronger the greater the di¤erence between S and F , an increase in 0 therefore raises incentives. A similar argument applies for 0 . Notice that changing 0 , and 0 does not a¤ect the inferences that employers draw from the outcomes (in equilibrium when they correctly anticipate x) but they a¤ect the value to the agent of being thought of as a particular type. We therefore term this channel for in ‡uencing an agent's incentives a "value e¤ect".
We now turn to the comparative statics with respect to the …rst period productivities through changes in , and . If the beliefs about the type of the agent are …xed, then increasing , and has no e¤ect whatsoever on the value of the agent in Period 2. Changing and , however, can a¤ect the inferences that employers draw from an observation of success or failure, we therefore term such changes as having an "information e¤ect". In particular, intuition can be drawn from the observation that for a …xed level of e¤ort, increasing (reducing) in the case where > (where < ) increases the probability that "better types" generate success and decreases the probability that they generate failure.
Therefore, conditional on observing on a success, employers believe that the agent is more likely to be at the top of the ability distribution and so S is higher, while conditional on observing a failure, employers believe that the agent is less likely to be at the top of the distribution and so F is lower. In particular, therefore, (S F ) increases. Similar arguments apply with regard to changes in .
Reputation for excellence or ineptitude
This paper relates to a wider literature on reputation. Much of the economic literature on reputation has focused on a reputation for excellence (trying to show that you are a type who always does well, or where reputation is about "who you'd like to be"). 9 In these models, the "most able" are non strategic and implicitly, they are assumed to be somewhat unusual or scarce, so for example with that view of the world, one might expect and common intuition suggests that often reputational concerns might also relate to avoiding a reputation for ineptitude (trying to show that you are not an inept type who always does badly or where reputation is about "who you're not") where the top of the distribution is the strategic type, and the bottom of the distribution is an inept types whom one might expect to be little a¤ected by training.
The distinction between these two approaches to reputation has been forcibly made [1981] for example) and a great deal of intuition has also used the term in a somewhat looser fashion to consider sustaining certain actions in in…nitely repeated games. As highlighted in Fudenberg and Levine [1989] this corresponds closely to the notion of reputation where reputation is a concern to show that you're a "Stackelberg" type-that is a type whose behavior a strategic agent would like to promise to commit to-similar to what we term later in this note a reputation for excellence. See Bar-Isaac and Tadelis [2007] for a review of this literature and alternative approaches to reputation. reputation leads to increasing certainty about the agent's type over time and so reputational incentives disappear over time unless type uncertainty is continually introduced. 10 In practice, it is far from obvious whether it is more appropriate to think of agents as particularly concerned that others should think them to be excellent or that they should not think them to be inept. However, as we illustrate, modelling reputational concerns in these two ways can lead to opposite conclusions. This paper highlights an important distinction between the two approaches in a simple two-period model. Speci…cally, following the intuition of the paragraphs above, making the strategic agent more e¢ cient diminishes reputational concerns (reducing e¤ort) when reputation is about excellence but increases reputational concerns when reputation is about ineptitude.
To see this more clearly consider setting = 1 and the degenerate distribution g(0) = 1 p and g(1) = p. This corresponds to a fairly typical model where type t = 0 corresponds to the strategic type whose reputational concern is to try to convince customers that she is the "excellent" or Stackelberg type. Following Proposition 2, in this case improving the strategic agent by raising would reduce e¤ort.
In contrast suppose that a strategic agent's reputational concern is to avoid a reputation for ineptitude. This corresponds to the model where = 0 with g(0) = 1 p and g(1) = p and in this case improving the strategic agent by raising would increase equilibrium e¤ort.
1 0 Further in Mailath and Samuelson [1998] , the model is constructed in such a way that there is unravelling so that if there are no reputational incentives at some point, there are no such incentives throughout.
The more general point on reputational incentives disappearing over time without some kind of replenishment of type uncertainty applies more widely. Indeed, Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson [2004] show this to be the case unless actions are perfectly observable, even in the case when reputation is about excellence and a competent agent can perfectly mimic an excellent agent (though incentives may disappear only in the very long run).
Bar-Isaac [2007] suggests an endogenous mechanism to maintain type uncertainty by allowing agents to choose to work in teams. Liu [2007] supposes that receivers must pay to observe history. This also provides an endogenous mechanism which limits an audience's certainty about type.
It is worth noting that in those papers that have considered something akin to the inept type we consider in this paper (in particular Diamond [1989] 
Many periods
Extending the model beyond two periods is not straightforward. First, in a multi-period model, the agent's belief about herself (and in particular whether she knows her type) will make a di¤erence. This belief will a¤ect her expectations of continuation values in all periods up until the last one, and so a modeler must take a stance on this belief. 12 Second, with many time periods and di¤erent types, there are many equilibrium conditions that need to be simultaneously satis…ed. For example, a decision on how much e¤ort to exert with two periods remaining must take into account not only the agent's type but also expectations of what e¤orts she will take (and what e¤orts the public would anticipate and so compensate) in subsequent periods. Similarly, e¤orts in later periods depend on reputations that arise as a result of e¤orts in earlier periods. In contrast to the single equilibrium condition (4) that appears in this model, in a multi-period extension one needs to solve a system of non-linear equations. This makes an analytical characterization challenging, though for a …nite-period (if not an in…nite horizon) model one can proceed by backwards induction, where the analysis of the penultimate period would be identical 1 1 In those papers, it is only useful to be thought of as a competent type if you can somehow also commit to exerting e¤ort. Diamond also allows for an inept type that always fails, but has a strategic type for whom = 0, Cabral and Hortacsu [2004] is an exception in supposing that 6 = 0. 1 2 Note also that if the agent does not know her type initially, she will learn it at a di¤erent rate to customers, as she observes whether or not she has made a strategic decision and the level of e¤ort (which would be relevant for considering o¤-equilibrium deviations) and not just the outcome, which is all that the public observes.
to our two-period model.
We numerically analyze a three period version of our model in a Appendix B, in which all the qualitative results of the two period model appear to be robust. 13 Nevertheless, although a number of forces operate in the same way and dominate in the many numerical parametrizations we have explored, there are some subtle and potentially counter-acting mechanisms. These can be understood by distinguishing between information and value e¤ects,as we did in Section 5.3.
The information e¤ect works as described above: increasing in the case that e¤ort and ability are complements or when they are substitutes suggests that, all else equal, outcomes are more informative signals on ability. As long as the value of entering the second period with a given reputation is non-decreasing, then since outcomes are more informative, the agent will be induced to exert more e¤ort. In the case where e¤ort and ability are substitutes, then following Proposition 1(ii) the agent always prefers that potential employers think she is better (and so more likely to be succeeding with probability ) than exerting e¤ort (in particular the very best agent t = 1 has no opportunity to exert e¤ort).
In this case therefore, the value with two remaining periods is indeed non-decreasing in reputation. It is theoretically possible however, that it can be non-monotonic when e¤ort and ability are complements. In this case, even the best possible agent (that is one of type t = 0) would prefer to commit to exerting e¤ort. With no means to do so, the agent may bene…t more from uncertainty about her ability which induces her to exert e¢ cient e¤ort than from having potential employers certain that she is excellent (and thereby dampening her incentives for e¤ort). Although, this is a theoretical possibility, we have been unable to …nd numerical examples. 14 In both cases, where e¤ort and ability are substitutes or complements, the value e¤ect can be decomposed into two e¤ects. Consider, increasing in the complements case for the second and third periods but not for the …rst period. First, one can think of a "direct" value e¤ect, "better"agents are more productive as in the main model and so agents should seek to prove themselves to better, leading to similar comparative statics. However, there is an additional "indirect" value e¤ect, which is that second period e¤orts are altered, as described in the main model. Speci…cally, these increase at all reputation levels. It is theoretically conceivable that second period e¤orts might increase so much more for a second period reputation that arises following a …rst period failure than a …rst period success that it dampens …rst period incentives.
Overall, therefore the "direct" value e¤ect boost e¤orts, as will the information e¤ect in the case where e¤ort and ability are substitutes. Although, the "indirect" value e¤ects (in both cases) and the information e¤ect when e¤ort and ability are complements might possibly work in the opposite direction, we have been unable to …nd examples in which our qualitative results on comparative statics are overturned in a three period extension of the model. 15 
Summary
At heart this paper highlights the simple observation that the distribution of prior beliefs is a crucial determinant of reputational incentives. There are numerous considerations which a¤ect such prior beliefs, including for example contemporaries and social peers.
Further, there are many policies that …rms undertake (in particular, we have focused on training and recruitment policies) which a¤ect the shape of the distribution of these priors.
Di¤erent policies which a¤ect the mean ability in the same way can have exactly opposite implications for reputational concerns. A Derivation of S(x) and F (x) Suppose that the equilibrium e¤ort level is given by x. Then a type t agent generates success in the …rst period with probability
and generates a failure with probability
By Bayes rule, the probability density function given a success and given the belief that agents exert e¤ort x in the …rst period can be written down as
and the probability density function given a failure in the …rst period is
In the second period, an agent of type t will exert no e¤ort and so succeed with probability t + (1 t) = t( ) + . In particular it follows, that if employers believed that the types were distributed according to h(:) going into period 2 then they would be willing to pay the agent R 1 0 (t( ) + )h(t)dt. It follows that the wage that employers would pay following success and failure respectively are given by:
where
, and (20)
Proof. of Proposition 1 We begin by proving (i) and (ii) for any equilibirium e¤ort e . (i) Notice that S(x) < 1 for all x and F (x) > 0 for all x; so in particular S( ) F ( ) < 1, then the equilibrium e¤ort level e = S(e ) F (e ) < 1 =) e <
(ii) For contradiction suppose that e < 0; then consider
Note that 1 e > T ( e ) since T < 1 and 1 > so the denominator is positive and since > and e < 0 it follows that S(e ) F (e ) < 0 but then it is impossible that S(e ) F (e ) = e > 0, which is our desired contradiction.
It su¢ ces to show that there exists a unique solution for the equation (4), which is in the range (0; ).
Let h(x) = x + S(x) F (x). The equilibrium e¤ort is then given by the solution of h(e ) = 0 for e 2 (0; ): Note that h(0) = S(0) F (0) > 0 and given (i) and (ii), h(0) > 0 and h( ) < 0: Moreover, h(x) is continuous, and thus there exists at least one solution in the range (0; ).
In order to demonstrate uniqueness, …rst take the derivative of (S F ):
Then if > , d(S F ) dx < 0 and so h(x) is monotonically decreasing in the range (0; ) and so the solution must be unique.
If < then d(S F ) dx > 0 and so potentially, h(x) could be increasing in some subset of (0; ) (note that since h(0) > 0 and h( ) < 0 at must be decreasing in some of the range). However, we know that, when < ,
Suppose for a contradiction that h(e ) = 0 has a number of solutions 0 < e 1 < : : : < e N < . Then …rst note that since h(0) > 0 and h( ) < 0 then N must be an odd number. In particular therefore if there are multiple solutions to h(e ) in the range then there must be at least three. However h(0) > 0 and 0 < e 1 < e 2 < e 3 with h(e 1 ) = h(e 2 ) = h(e 3 ) = 0 requires
B Three period, two type model
There are two types of agents parameterized by 0 t T 1. Production is as in the main model. Speci…cally in each period, a type i agent will have no strategic decision to make with probability i and in this case will succeed (for example by producing a high quality product) with probability and fails with probability 1
. Otherwise (with probability 1 i) the agent must make an e¤ort decision. In this latter case, when she chooses e¤ort e, she succeeds with probability + e. Thus overall an i-type agent exerting e¤ort e when given the opportunity to exert e¤ort would succeed with probability i + (1 i)( + e) and fail otherwise. E¤ort is costly and, speci…cally, exerting e¤ort e costs the agent e 2 2 . Let r j denote the public's belief that the agent is of type t at time j. Note that in contrast to the two period case, for multiple periods, it will make a di¤erence whether we assume that agents know their own types or not. Here we assume that agents do not know their own types initially. Therefore if they observe that they have an e¤ort decision to make they gain some information about their type. We can write the private, intermediate belief after observing an opportunity to exert e¤ort as
As before, employers are risk neutral, value a success at 1 and a failure at 0 and they Bertrand compete for the agent's service in each period. Moreover, outcomes are observable but e¤ort is not observable and contracts are incomplete, so that in e¤ect an agent is paid in advance at a wage which is simply the employers'common belief that the agent will produce a success.
There are three periods of trade, and outcomes are observed (and beliefs revised) at the end of each period. Speci…cally timing is as follows:
1. Period 1 (a) employers Bertrand compete for the agent's service (b) the agent observes whether or not a task where she has an opportunity to exert e¤ort arises, and updates her belief about her ability and then decides the level of e¤ort if appropriate (that is if it is a task where e¤ort will make a di¤erence) (c) success/failure commonly observed (d) employers update beliefs according to Bayes rule 2. Period 2 (a) employers Bertrand compete for the agent's service (b) the agent decides the level of e¤ort if appropriate (that is if it is a task where e¤ort will make a di¤erence) (c) success/failure commonly observed (d) employers update beliefs according to Bayes rule 3. Period 3: employers Bertrand compete for the agent's service We suppose that agents weigh the periods equally and that agents maximize the sum of pro…ts for the three periods and we solve for the e¤ort exerted in the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
B.1 Solving the model
Work by backwards induction.
B.1.1 Period 3
In the …nal period neither type exerts e¤ort.
Suppose that an agent enters this last period L with reputation r 3 (probability of being T type) then regardless of his type, he earns r 3 (T + (1 T ) ) + (1 r 3 )(t + (1 t) ) = + ( )t + (T t)( )r 3 So we can write the values for type t and T to entering the third period with reputation r 3 respectively as
B.1.2 Period 2
Following the analysis in the two-period model, then both types of agent will exert the same e¤ort (that is x t 2 = x T 2 = x 2 ) which will be a function of r 2 the reputation at the start of period 2, which will in turn determine the equilibrium expectation of e¤ort x e 2 (so that this is a function of r 2 , though we often suppress this argument to avoid burdensome notation) and in particular this e¤ort is
, and
.
Of course, as in the paper, one must worry about interiority and the existence and uniqueness of the solution, though for now we take these for granted and return later to verify them numerically.
We can then write down the second period value as a function of both the public belief r 2 and the agent's private belief, p 1
Finally, if the initial reputation is r 1 and the public anticipates e¤orts x e 1 then we can write
; and
Then …rst period e¤ort would solve 16 :
B.1.4 Equilibrium conditions
The conditions for equilibrium are
x 2 (r Note in particular, that while the two-period model had a single (non-linear) equation to be satis…ed. Here with two types and three periods, there are three non-linear equations which must be simultaneously satis…ed. We were unable to solve that model analytically but it can be solved numerically..
B.2 Numerical Calculations
We have conducted many simulations by setting all parameters values of the model but one or two that we allow to vary over a speci…c range. For those speci…c values of the parameters we solved the previous system of non-linear equations and we have computed the exerted e¤orts levels that are the endogenous variables of the model. Finally, we have successfully checked the comparative statics results of the paper. 17 In doing so, it is important to notice that in the two period model of the paper there was only one level of exerted e¤ort. However, in this extended version of the model we have to compute three e¤ort levels: e¤ort exerted in period one, e¤ort exerted in period two after a success and e¤ort exerted in period two after a failure. In order to be able to compare both models, we take an ex-ante point of view and we aggregate these three e¤ort levels into a new variable "lifetime expected e¤ort". This variable is the expected exerted e¤ort in the three period, which is a weighted average of the three e¤ort levels (weighted by the prior belief and probabilities of …rst period success and failure).
In the following, we will provide two scenarios that illustrate two of the main results of the paper. Let t = 0:2 and T = 0:8 be the two types, meaning that type t (T )will have no strategic decision to make with probability 0:2 (0:8).
We consider …rst the case of "creative"work where e¤ort and ability are complements. Suppose that when having no opportunity to exert e¤ort then both types will succeed with probability = 0. In case that the agent will have to exert e¤ort, then an agent succeeds with probability + e, where varies in this simulation between 0:1 and 0:4, and the inverse of the marginal cost of e¤ort, , varies between 0:04 and 0:3. Finally, the public's belief that the agent is of type t at time 1 is r 1 = 0:5. Given this set of parameters, we solve the non-linear system numerically and we compute e¤orts for di¤erent values of and . The …gure below shows a two dimensional surface to illustrate how lifetime expected e¤ort varies with the probability of success and the inverse of the marginal cost The mu=0 case The …gure above shows the lifetime e¤ort jointly increases in both and , as predicted in Propositions 2 and 4. Notice, that the relationship between lifetime e¤ort and ; depends on whether or not, is larger than : The previous …gure illustrate the case in which > = 0.
We analyze the opposite case (routine work or where e¤ort and ability are substitutes) by keeping the same parameter values but for changing to = 1. The theoretical prediction is that, the e¤ort must be decreasing in .
The mu=1 case
The …gure above shows that in this case (that is when < = 1) the lifetime e¤ort decreases on as is predicted in Proposition 4.
Our purpose with these examples is to show that the driving forces in the two period model play an important role in the extended model, and hence it is easy to …nd regular examples that are consistent with our predicted results. However, we have to acknowledge that there several caveats: i) We rely on the numerical Matlab procedure to solve our non-linear system, this procedure works well with interior solutions but not as well with extreme values of the parameters. ii) The numerical solutions are regular, and they behave smoothly with small changes in the parameters. Hence, we think that the solution is unique and hence our comparative static argument holds, however we do not have a formal proof of this uniqueness.
